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TO EXPLOIT THE CLIENT
Haynes v. Kuder'
I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes between an attorney and client over legal fees place a tremendous
strain on an attorney's fiduciary obligations to his or her client.2 These disputes
arise more frequently and cause more public resentment than any other issue
between an attorney and client.3 To combat these problems, the legal profession
has begun to suggest arbitration as a means to resolve disputes over legal fees.4
However, certain problems arise when an attorney includes an arbitration clause
in a retainer agreement.
An attorney is in an influential and superior position to the client when
negotiating fee contracts.5  Because of this position, an attorney has the
opportunity to exploit his or her client.6 Consequently, courts view agreements
between a lawyer and client rather suspiciously and apply a higher standard to
these agreements. 7 Furthermore, a lawyer is subject to ethical rules which
require a lawyer to meet certain duties, including the duty to inform the client
about matters regarding the representation! Because of the higher obligations
1. 591 A.2d 1286 (D.C. 1991).
2. See James R. Devine, Mandatory Arbitration of Attorney-Client Fee Disputes: A Concept
Whose Time Has Come, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1205, 1205 (1983); see also infra notes 68-70
(discussing the attorney's fiduciary duties).
3. Lester Brickman, Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration: A Dissenting View, 1990 UTAH L. REV.
277, 277.
4. See Devine, supra note 2, at 1222-26.
5. See Brickman, supra note 3, at 285; Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1951);
see also infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
6. See Brickman, supra note 3, at 286.
7. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
8. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1989) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1986) [hereinafter MODEL CODE];
see also infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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imposed on an attorney when dealing with a client, any benefit of the doubt
should go to the client in matters such as whether a claim is covered by an
arbitration clause or whether an attorney fully explained the implications of an
arbitration clause.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1985, Ellen Haynes retained an attorney from Maryland to represent her
in a marital dispute with her husband.9 At the time, she and her husband were
both Maryland residents.'" In 1986, Haynes separated from her husband, and
she moved to the District of Columbia." In November 1986, Haynes consulted
with Armin Kuder, an attorney licensed to practice in the District of Columbia,
to discuss whether Kuder would represent her in her domestic dispute. 2
Kuder later mailed a proposed retainer agreement 3 and a cover letter to
Haynes at her home.' 4 The cover letter explained the initial steps that Kuder
proposed to take if Haynes did, in fact, decide to retain him.'" In the letter,
Kuder stated that his first step would be to communicate with Haynes' "present
counsel" (her attorney in Maryland) in order to learn about the case.' 6 Kuder
noted that the attorney in Maryland had "indicated a willingness to cooperate
fully" with Kuder in his representation of Haynes.17 The proposed retainer
agreement also described in detail how fees would be calculated and billed.' 8
Among the terms of the proposed agreement was an arbitration provision.'9
This provision stated that the parties agreed to submit to arbitration any claims
9. Haynes, 591 A.2d at 1287.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Her Maryland attorney had advised her to consult with an attorney from the District of
Columbia. Id.





18. Id. Kuder had also attached his firm's current fee schedule to the letter. Id.
19. Id. at 1287-88. The provision, in full, stated as follows:
Although we do not anticipate any dispute concerning payment of fees, it is
our policy that in case any such disputes arise, they will be handled through
the less formal and more expeditious process of arbitration, rather than court
action. Accordingly, it is agreed between you and the firm that any claim
by the firm for unpaid fees and expenses, and any defenses or counterclaims
to such a claim, whether based on a claim of inadequate representation or
any other ground, shall be resolved exclusively through arbitration in the
District of Columbia under the then applicable rules of the American
Arbitration Association. Judgment upon an award rendered by the
Arbitrator(s) in any such proceeding maybe [sic] entered and enforced in any
Court of competent jurisdiction.
Id. at 1288 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 1992, No. 2
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"by the firm for unpaid fees and expenses, and any defenses or counterclaims to
such a claim, whether based on a claim of inadequate representation or any other
ground. "20 The retainer agreement asked for Haynes' signature of acceptance
"[i]f the foregoing terms correctly reflect our agreement and understanding." 21
On December 22, 1986, Haynes signed the agreement to retain Kuder.22
In the summer of 1987, Kuder, acting as Haynes' attorney, filed an action
for divorce in Maryland.2 3 In September 1988, the dispute was settled;24 at
that time, Haynes owed Kuder almost $11,000 in attorney's fees.25
On July 20, 1989, Haynes filed suit against Kuder in Superior Court in the
District of Columbia. 26 Haynes alleged legal malpractice, and she demanded a
jury trial.27 Within three weeks, Kuder demanded arbitration of the dispute in
accordance with the retainer agreement's arbitration clause. 28 Haynes resisted
arbitration; Kuder then filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay the
malpractice action in superior court.29 In an affidavit in support of his motion,
Kuder stated that he had "fully discussed with Mrs. Haynes all of the terms of the
[retainer agreement], including the arbitration provisions," before she signed the
agreement.30
In her opposing motion, Haynes challenged the validity of the retainer
agreement and the arbitration clause; she alleged that Kuder had fraudulently
induced her to hire him and that he had fraudulently procured the arbitration
clause through misrepresentation. 3' Haynes stated that Kuder did not
call my attention to or explain the meaning or significance of the
arbitration clause to me. I had never before been involved in an
arbitration proceeding or in a civil lawsuit for damages, and had no
idea that by signing the retainer agreement I was giving up my right to
sue Mr. Kuder for his negligence, or to have a jury determine the
merits of my claims. If he had done so, I would have insisted on
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Haynes also argued that a malpractice claim is outside the scope of the arbitration
clause because an agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims violates ethical
standards for lawyers.33
The trial court granted Kuder's motion to compel arbitration. 3' The judge
found that the arbitration clause was valid and enforceable.35 The judge
reasoned that the retainer agreement, on its face, made it clear to Haynes that the
"process of arbitration" would be utilized to determine any "dispute[s] concerning
payment of fees" and that arbitration would be an alternative to "court action. ,
36
The judge also found that Haynes had not been pressured by Kuder into agreeing
to the arbitration clause. 37 The judge relied on: (1) the fact that Kuder mailed
the agreement to Haynes "to read and accept if she so chose;" (2) his perception
that "[t]he clause is not couched in arcane legal jargon;" and (3) the fact that
Haynes could have consulted another attorney, especially given that she had
another attorney at the time. 3' The judge also determined that Haynes'
malpractice claim was "clear[ly]" within the scope of the arbitration agreement
because the basis of Haynes' claim was the inadequacy of Kuder's legal
representation. 39 Finally, the trial court decided that Kuder neither violated any
rules of legal ethics nor improperly limited his liability for malpractice by
including the arbitration clause to resolve malpractice claims in the retainer
agreement. °
The District of Columbia Court. of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision.4 The court of appeals held first that the arbitration clause contained
in the retainer agreement was "susceptible of an interpretation" that would include
Haynes' claim, which alleged damages in connection with the value of Kuder's
services rendered.42 The court also held that the arbitration clause in the
retainer agreement, by itself, "sufficiently appraised Haynes that she was
relinquishing her right to sue in court - and hence receive a jury trial - on any






38. Id. at 1288-89 n.3.
39. Id. at 1288-89. The judge considered that Haynes' claim was encompassed in the arbitration
agreement by that language of "any defenses or counterclaims to such a claim [for unpaid legal fees],
whether based on a claim of inadequate representation or any other ground." Id. at 1289.
40. Id. at 1289. After a four-day hearing, the arbitrators issued an award dismissing Haynes'
malpractice claims. Id. n.4. Kuder moved for an order confirming the award, and Haynes moved
to vacate the award. Id. The trial judge, ruling that Haynes had presented no colorable argument to
vacate, confirmed the award and entered judgment for Kuder on June 21, 1990. Id.
41. Id. at 1292.
42. Id. at 1289.
43. Id. at 1291; see also id. at 1290-91 ("[W]e agree with the trial judge that the written
disclosure was sufficient to negate the claim of fraudulent inducement as a matter of law").
[Vol. 1992, No. 2
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A court is faced with two competing policies when it considers a case
involving an arbitration agreement between an attorney and his or her client. The
first is the strong policy favoring arbitration as a means for resolving disputes."
The second involves an attorney's fiduciary duty to a client, whereby the attorney
owes the client the duty of protecting the client's best interests.45
The United States Supreme Court, in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp.,46 supported the approach that "questions of
arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy
favoring arbitration. "" The Court stated that the Federal Arbitration Act48
establishes that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration."" The Court, two years later, added that this
strong policy favoring arbitration, as expressed in the Arbitration Act, requires
that courts "rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."50
In light of this strong policy favoring arbitration, the Supreme Court has
stated that there is a "presumption of arbitrability" when a contract contains an
arbitration clause."1 The Court has also stated that any doubts should be
resolved in favor of coverage and that a motion to compel arbitration should not
be denied "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause
is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. "52
However, "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required
to submit to arbitration any dispute which he [or she] has not agreed to
submit."53 Therefore, "[tihe first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of
a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute. " 4
This preliminary question may involve the issues of whether the arbitration clause
covers the particular dispute or whether the clause is valid at all.
44. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
45. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
46. 460 U.S. 1.
47. Id. at 24.
48. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
49. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25; see also Sindler v. Batleman, 416 A.2d 238, 243 (D.C.
1980).
50. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
51. AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986).
52. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960). The District of Columbia also applies this "susceptible of an interpretation" standard to
determine whether a particular dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement. See Haynes, 591 A.2d
at 1289; see also Carter v. Cathedral Ave. Coop., Inc., 566 A.2d 716, 717 (D.C. 1989); American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 3721 v. District of Columbia, 563 A.2d 361, 362 (D.C. 1989).
53. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582; accord Lawrence v. Walzer & Gabrielson, 256 Cal. Rptr.
6, 8 (Ct. App. 1989).
54. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985); see
also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 563 A.2d at 362.
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If a party can show that there was fraud in the inducement of an arbitration
clause, "then there would be no valid agreement to arbitrate, and the policies
favoring arbitration would not apply. 55 This rule is based on the idea that there
was really no mutual assent if one party obtained the other's consent to a clause
in a contract through fraud or even through misrepresentation falling short of
fraud.56 In addition, in a suit against a fiduciary (such as an attorney57), it is
not necessary to establish all of the elements that would be required for a fraud
claim against a party in an arms-length transaction.58 In a case where a
fiduciary has a duty to disclose, the "[nlondisclosure of material information may
constitute fraud. 59  The reason for relaxed requirements in a suit against a
fiduciary is that "[ciourts have imposed on a fiduciary an affirmative duty of
'utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material facts,' as well as
an affirmative obligation 'to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading' his [or
her] clients. "'
In particular, "[flee contracts between attorney and client are a subject of
special interest and concern to the courts."6 These contracts are not to be
evaluated and enforced according to the standards for ordinary commercial
contracts. 62.Instead, a court reviewing fee agreements should apply a standard
of good faith and reasonableness. 63  The reason for this higher standard is to
protect the client "against the strong influence to which the confidential [attorney-
55. Hercules & Co. v. Shama Restaurant Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 39 (D.C. 1989). The Hercules
court also noted that when a party makes a claim of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause
the court is free to adjudicate that claim. Id. (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967)). However, if the claim were for "fraud in the inducement of the
[entire] contract" then the court would have to allow the case to be decided by an arbitrator. Prima
Paint, 388 U.S. at 404; accord McGuire, Comwell & Blakey v. Grider, 765 F. Supp. 1048, 1050
(D. Colo. 1991).
56. Hollywood Credit Clothing Co. v. Gibson, 188 A.2d 348, 349 (D.C. 1963). However, at
least one federal district court has placed emphasis on the fact that a client had another attorney at the
time that the client claimed to be fraudulently induced to enter into an arbitration agreement.
McGuire, Cornwell & Blakey, 765 F. Supp. at 1051.
57. See infra note 68.
58. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).
In general, the elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim which a plaintiff must prove are: "(1)
a false representation, (2) with respect to a material fact, (3) made with knowledge of its falsity, (4)
and with the intent to deceive, (5) with action taken in reliance upon the representation." Rothenberg
v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 495 F. Supp. 399, 406 (D.D.C. 1980) (citing Nader v. Allegheny
Airlines, 512 F.2d 527, 541 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976));
see also Pyne v. Jamaica Nutrition Holdings Ltd., 497 A.2d 118, 131 (D.C. 1985). Silence may be
a "false representation" where the party has a duty to disclose certain information. Rothenberg, 495
F. Supp. at 406.
59. Pyne, 497 A.2d at 131.
60. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 194 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 534-35 (1955)); see infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
61. Spilker, 188 F.2d at 39.
62. Id.
63. Saul v. Blumenfeld, 445 A.2d 613, 614 (D.C. 1982); see also Brickman, supra note 3, at
284 (stating that the standard applied by courts is a "fairness-in-fact" standard).
6
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client] relation naturally gives rise. "' Furthermore, courts should closely
scrutinize contracts, beneficial to a lawyer, that are "executed long after the
attorney-client relationship has commenced, when the position of trust is well
established. "' In California, all transactions "between an attorney and his [or
her] client that are beneficial to the attorney are closely scrutinized with the
utmost strictness for any unfairness."' One court, in fact, has recognized that
although arbitration clauses offer benefits to both a lawyer and client, an
attorney's objective in including such a clause in the retainer agreement is usually
to avoid a jury trial and thereby hopefully to minimize losses and to reduce a
client's recovery for any legal malpractice claim.67
In evaluating contracts between a lawyer and a client, a court must consider
the attorney's fiduciary, or trustee, relation to the client.6" As a fiduciary, the
lawyer has a duty to the client "to exercise the highest degree of good faith,
honesty, integrity, fairness, and fidelity. "69 Furthermore, the attorney owes the
client "a duty of full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client's
interests. "70
The fiduciary relationship also precludes an attorney "'from having personal
interests antagonistic to those of his [or her] client or from obtaining personal
advantage or profit out of the relationship without the knowledge or consent of
his [or her] client.'"7' The making of a formal contract between the lawyer and
64. Spilker, 188 F.2d at 39 (citation omitted).
65. Id; see also Pete v. United Mine Workers, 517 F.2d 1275, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Saul, 445
A.2d at 614-15. The Spilker court discusses the various approaches taken by different jurisdictions
in these situations. See Spilker, 188 F.2d at 39. Some courts treat these kind of contracts as void.
Id. (quoting In re Howell, 109 N.E. 572, 574 (N.Y. 1915)). Others categorize them as affirmatively
invalid on the ground of fraud, and these courts subsequently place the burden on the attorney to prove
the fairness of the agreement. Id. (quoting Howell, 109 N.E. at 574). Many other jurisdictions treat
these contracts with a presumption of invalidity. Id.
In Saul, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals emphasized that a contract entered into two
weeks after the initial consultation and before litigation began was subject only to the standard of good
faith and reasonableness and not to the higher standard applied to contracts execute-,. iong after the
attorney-client relationship is established. Saul, 445 A.2d at 615.
66. Clancy v. State Bar, 454 P.2d 329, 333 (Cal. 1969); see also Hawk v. State Bar, 754 P.2d
1096, 1101 (Cal. 1988).
67. Lawrence, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 10 n.5 (quoting Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr.
775, 786 (Ct. App. 1976)).
68. See Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Ctr., 917 F.2d 1560, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990)
(attorneys had a fiduciary relationship to their client); Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d
1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976) ("A lawyer's duty to his (or her] client is that of a fiduciary or trustee.");
Hendrickson v. Sears, 310 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Mass. 1974) ("The relation of attorney and client is
highly fiduciary in its nature."); see also Brickman, supra note 3, at 282-84.
69. Condren v. Grace, 783 F. Supp. 178, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also Udall v. Littell, 366
F.2d 668, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (an attorney is "bound to the highest duty of fidelity, honor, fair
dealing and full disclosure to a client"), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967); Paul G. George,
Comment, Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes: New Direction for Professional Responsibility, 5
UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 309, 311 (1976).
70. Hendrickson, 316 N.E.2d at 135.
71. Condren, 783 F. Supp. at 182 (quoting Hafter v. Farkas, 498 F.2d 587, 589 (2d Cir. 1974)).
7
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client presents special problems because the lawyer "is dealing in an area in which
he [or she] is expert and the client is not and as to which the client must
necessarily rely on the attorney. "' One particular concern which arises is the
fear that attorneys will use their superior knowledge and their superior bargaining
position to take advantage of their clients.73 When the client puts trust in the
attorney, the attorney then has the opportunity to exploit the client.74 As one
court has noted, the confidential, fiduciary relationship between an attorney and
a client is "fraught with the dangers of imposition and overreaching."75 "The
overreaching can arise purely and simply from the position of responsibility
entrusted to attorneys generally. "76
With consultation prior to a retainer agreement, an important determination
is when the attorney-client relationship actually begins since the lawyer does not
formally represent the client until after the retainer agreement is signed.' In
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,78 the Seventh Circuit
recognized that "[t] he fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client
extends to preliminary consultation by a prospective client with a view to retention
of the lawyer" even if actual employment does not result.79 One federal district
court has noted that the above statement from Westinghouse Electric is the
"emerging general rule"' and that "the test for determining the existence of [the
attorney's] fiduciary relationship is a subjective one." 8'
72. Udall, 366 F.2d at 676.
73. See Brickman, supra note 3, at 285.
74. See id. at 286.
75. In re Will of Tank, 503 N.Y.S.2d 495, 497 (Civ. Ct. 1986).
76. Id.
77. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1316-19 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
78. 580 F.2d 1311.
79. Id. at 1319 (relying on MODEL CODE, supra note 8, EC 4-1); accord Nolan v. Foreman, 665
F.2d 738, 739 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The fiduciary relationship between an attorney and his [or her]
client extends even to preliminary consultations between the client and the attorney regarding the
attorney's possible retention. "); see also Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Barosh, Nos. 91 C 2 & 91
C 25, 1992 WL 168535, at *4 (N.D. II1. July 14, 1992); Liu v. Real Estate Inv. Group, Inc., 771 F.
Supp. 83, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (confidentiality privilege extends to preliminary consultation by a
prospective client); Benge v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. Rptr. 275, 280 (Ct. App. 1982) (same); New
York Univ. v. Simon, 498 N.Y.S.2d 659, 661 (Civ. Ct. 1985) (same) (relying on the language "or
sought to employ him" from MODEL CODE, supra note 8, EC 4-1); Taylor v. Sheldon, 173 N.E.2d
892, 895 (Ohio 1961) (same); cf. Miller v. Metzinger, 154 Cal. Rptr. 22, 27 (Ct. App. 1979) (the
absence of a retainer agreement "does not prevent the [attorney-client] relationship from arising");
Maryland State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 85-50 (1985) ("A lawyer may not conclude that a
lawyer-client relationship did not exist [with] a corporation merely because a financial relationship did
not exist."). But see McGuire, Cornwell & Blakey, 765 F. Supp. at 1051 (the attorney's fiduciary
relationship did not arise until the client signed the fee agreement); Bingham v. Zolt, 683 F. Supp.
965, 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same); Zych v. Jones, 406 N.E.2d 70, 74 (II1. App. Ct. 1980) (attorney-
client relationship is created only by a retainer, an offer to retain, or a fee paid).
80. Green v. Montgomery County, Alabama, 784 F. Supp. 841, 845 (N.D. Ala. 1992)..
81. Id.
[Vol. 1992, No. 2
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Another illustration of a lawyer's heightened duty to the client may be seen
in certain rules regulating the lawyer's conduct. 82 For example, Rule 1.4(b) of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that "[a] lawyer shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation. "83 The Comment to this rule adds that
a lawyer may not withhold information to serve his or her own interest."
Ethical Consideration 7-8 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility states:
"A lawyer should exert his [or her] best efforts to insure that the decisions of his
[or her] client are made only after the client has been informed of relevant
considerations. A lawyer ought to initiate this decision-making process if the
client does not do so. "8
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility discusses the issue of clauses
in a retainer agreement to limit the lawyer's liability for malpractice. Disciplinary
Rule 6-102 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself from
or limit his liability to his client for his personal malpractice."' Ethical
Consideration 6-6 adds that a lawyer who does not properly handle the affairs of
the client should not be permitted to limit his liability for his professional
activities.8" A District of Columbia ethics opinion provides that arbitration
agreements which cover all disputes between an attorney and client are unethical
"unless the client is represented by independent counsel in entering the
agreement." 8 An earlier opinion in the District of Columbia states that an
attorney may include an arbitration clause in a retainer agreement as long as, inter
alia, "the lawyer makes no false or misleading representations about the
agreement, and the lawyer fully discloses to the client all of the implications of
the arbitration provision, including loss of the client's right to sue in court and
have a jury trial." 9
82. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, preamble; MODEL CODE, supra note 8, preamble.
83. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.4(b).
84. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.4 cmt. This Comment also explains that "[tihe guiding
principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with
the duty to act in the client's best interests." Id.
85. MODEL CODE, supra note 8, EC 7-8.
86. MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 6-102; see, e.g., Alabama State Bar General Counsel, Op.
83-05 (1983); State Bar of California Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility & Conduct,
Formal Op. 1977-47; Virginia State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 638 (1984).
87. MODEL CODE, supra note 8, EC 6-6.
88. District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 211 (1990).
89. District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 190 (1988); see also Virginia State Bar
Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 638 (1984) (the lawyer must provide "full disclosure of the
effect of such a provision" and must "advise[] the client to seek independent counsel regarding the
advisability of the provision"); cf. State Bar of California Standing Comm. on Professional
Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1981-56 ("An attorney may not require as a condition of
employment that a client accept binding arbitration in advance of a dispute arising over fees.").
9
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. Whether the Claim Was Within the Scope
of the Arbitration Clause
The court of appeals recognized that the trial court decides as a matter of
law whether a particular dispute is arbitrable and that an appellate court reviews
that determination under the de novo standard of review.' ° In determining
whether a particular dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement, a court must
merely find that the arbitration clause is "susceptible of an interpretation" that
covers the dispute.9'
The court noted that the arbitration clause in the retainer agreement between
Haynes and Kuder provided for arbitration of any disputes arising from attorney
fee claims including "any defenses or counterclaims to such a claim [for unpaid
fees], whether based on a claim of inadequate representation or any other
ground."' The court then stated that Haynes' claim involved the value of
Kuder's legal services and included allegations of "inadequate representation. ",93
The majority added that Haynes' claim was for money damages consisting of
Kuder's legal fees and money lost in the divorce settlement because of Kuder's
negligence. 4  Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that the arbitration
clause in the retainer agreement was "susceptible of an interpretation" that
included Haynes' claim for monetary damages concerning the value of Kuder's
legal services rendered to her.'
B. Whether the Terms of the Arbitration Agreement
Were Fully Disclosed to Haynes
The court next discussed Haynes' allegation that Kuder had fraudulently
induced her and misled her into agreeing to the arbitration clause by failing to
disclose the ramifications of arbitration and other facts that he, as an attorney on
the verge of an attorney-client relationship, had a particular duty to disclose.'
The court stated that a claim of fraudulent inducement of an arbitration clause will
effectively deny the existence of an arbitration agreement such that a court is not
necessarily required to order arbitration.' After a denial is asserted, a court
makes a summary inquiry of the issue and decides whether the dispute should be
90. Haynes, 591 A.2d at 1289.
91. Id.




96. Id. at 1289-90.
97. Id. at 1290.
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sent to arbitration.9" In this summary inquiry, a court first determines if there
is a factual dispute. The court of appeals added that if a factual dispute does
exist, then a court must conduct an "expedited evidentiary hearing" to resolve the
dispute. 9
Turning to the case at bar, the court of appeals explained that the trial judge
had found it unnecessary to resolve the disputed issue of whether Kuder had
explained arbitration to Haynes.'O° According to the court of appeals, the trial
judge had instead decided that the written retainer agreement itself sufficiently
informed Haynes of the nature of arbitration and the limits arbitration places on
her ability later to challenge Kuder's performance.'O° The court of appeals then
admitted that there are "substantial ethical concerns" and that the written
agreement was "somewhat terse in explaining the rights Haynes would relinquish
by agreeing to arbitration.""°2 However, the court agreed with the trial judge
that the written arbitration clause itself "was sufficient to negate the claim of
fraudulent inducement as a matter of law.""03
The court recognized that agreements between an attorney and a client "are
governed by the standard of good faith and reasonableness."" °  According to
the court, this standard is higher than the standard for an ordinary commercial
contract, and it implies a heightened obligation of attorneys to be fair and frank
when specifying the terms of their relationship to the client.0 5 The court
distinguished between agreements which are executed long after the attorney-client
relationship has been established and those which occur early in the attorney-client
relationship.'06 In the former situation, such agreements will be scrutinized
closely, and the burden of proof of reasonableness is allocated to the attorney. 10
In the latter situation, such as this case, the court decided that there were no
added restrictions beyond the standard of good faith and reasonableness.' 08
The court next discussed an opinion issued by the District of Columbia Bar
Legal Ethics Committee."' 9 That opinion stated that when a retainer agreement
includes an arbitration clause, the attorney has the obligation "to disclose fully to
the client all of the implications of the arbitration provision, including loss of the
98. Id.
99. Id. (citations omitted). The court added that the procedure for resolving the denial of an




103. Id. at 1290-91.
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client's right to sue in court and have a jury trial.' '" The court found that the
written retainer agreement adequately informed Haynes thatshe was relinquishing
her right to a jury trial even though there was no express language to this effect
in the agreement."' Furthermore, the court rejected Haynes' argument that the
clause controlled only claims serving as a set-off and not those for independent
damages." 2 The court added that Haynes was still represented by an attorney
in Maryland when Kuder sent the proposed retainer agreement to Haynes and that
she was consequently free to get consultation. 3 Therefore, the court held that
the retainer agreement "sufficiently apprised Haynes that she was relinquishing
her right to sue in court - and hence receive a jury trial - on any claim she
might have against Kuder for inadequate representation."".4  The court then
affirmed the lower court's order confirming the arbitration award." 5
C. The Dissent
Associate Judge John M. Steadman conceded that the question of attorney
fees was subject to arbitration.I" He instead focused on whether the arbitration
agreement subjected Haynes' $1 million malpractice claim to arbitration," 7 and
he argued that this question should not have been decided without an evidentiary
hearing. 8
Judge Steadman found the arbitration clause unclear as to whether it covered
the malpractice claim."19 It was particularly unclear since the context of the
entire letter was devoted almost entirely to matters of fees and billings. 120
Judge Steadman argued that, because the clause was so unclear, it could not serve
on its face as full disclosure of all of its ramifications.' 2 ' He added that, given
the special nature of attorney-client agreements, there should have been a hearing
to get a "fuller understanding and exploration of the circumstances leading to the
execution of the agreement." 22 Judge Steadman also doubted the applicability
110. Id. This opinion was No. 190. Id.; see District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op.
190 (1988). However, as the court stated in a foomote, the District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics
Committee, in Opinion No. 211, reconsidered Opinion No. 190. Haynes, 591 A.2d at 1291 n.ll.
The court then suggested that Opinion No. 211, since it was issued more than three years after Haynes
and Kuder entered into this arbitration agreement, was not relevant to this decision. Haynes, 591 A.2d
at 1291.




115. Id. at 1292.






122. Id. at 1292.
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A. Was the Claim Within the Scope
of the Arbitration Clause?
Haynes first claimed that the arbitration clause was limited to the arbitration
of fee disputes and that it therefore did not cover her claim of malpractice.
24
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals holds that the arbitration clause
itself"5 is "'susceptible of an interpretation' that would include [the] claim for
damages." 2 6  Judge Steadman, in his dissent, disagrees with this conclusion;
he notes that "even with [his] lawyer's eye," the arbitration clause is unclear. 2
7
The majority spends only one paragraph in dismissing this first claim, 1 8
but the issue deserves more than the cursory analysis which the court gives it.
First, in passing over this issue, the Haynes court ignores the literal language of
the arbitration clause, which seems not to include Haynes' claim. Second, given
the heightened duties that a lawyer has to his or her client, it seems inconsistent
to apply a weak standard such as "susceptible of an interpretation" in determining
if Haynes' claim was within the terms of the arbitration clause.
Although there is a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration,2 9 a party
to a contract "cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he [or
she] has not agreed so to submit."" 3 Consequently, a court's first inquiry must
be whether the parties actually agreed to submit the particular dispute to
arbitration.' 3' In this case, it seems doubtful that the arbitration clause covered
a claim for malpractice. 3 2  Haynes' malpractice claim is not a claim based on
123. Id. n.2.
124. Id. at 1289.
125. For the full text of the arbitration clause, see supra note 19.
126. Haynes, 591 A.2d at 1289.
127. Id. at 1292 (Steadman, J., dissenting). Judge Steadman states that the arbitration clause is
made even more ambiguous by the context of the entire agreement, which was "devoted ... almost
entirely to matters of fees and billings." Id.
128. See id. at 1289.
129. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
130. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582.
131. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
132. From a strict interpretation of the clause, Haynes' malpractice allegation was a claim and
not a defense or counterclaim, and, therefore, it was not covered by the literal language of the clause.
See supra note 19 (listing the text of the arbitration clause). According to a literal reading of this
clause, Haynes agreed to submit to arbitration only her "defenses or counterclaims" to a claim by the
firm for unpaid fees and expenses, "whether based on a claim of inadequate representation or any
other ground." See supra note 19. While this writer feels that it would be form-over-substance to
make a distinction based on whether Haynes' allegation was a claim or a counterclaim, such a
distinction may have some merit in light of the rule of construction which interprets language of a
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unpaid fees or expenses. As Judge Steadman suggests in his dissent, Haynes' $1
million malpractice claim is quite different from a dispute over the $11,000 which
Haynes owed Kuder in legal fees.'3 In any event, this issue is far too unclear
for the court to dismiss it in one short paragraph.
The "susceptible of an interpretation" test which the court employs is the
main reason that the court can summarily dispose of Haynes' assertion that the
arbitration clause did not cover her malpractice claim. The court concludes that
Haynes' claim is based in part on "money damages consisting of fees paid to
Kuder" and that the "arbitration clause is thus 'susceptible of an interpretation'
that would include Haynes's monetary damage claim regarding the value of
Kuder's services rendered. "" This reasoning is not very convincing, especially
in light of the attorney's fiduciary duty 35 and his or her duty of disclosure'
13 6
to the client. Since the law requires an attorney to meet these heightened
standards when dealing with a client, it seems inconsistent to require only that the
arbitration clause in the retainer agreement be "susceptible of an interpretation"
which includes the client's claim. As evidenced by the Haynes decision, this test
can be easily met, and it gives too much deference to the lawyer. It gives the
benefit of the doubt to the lawyer, and it allows the lawyer to fashion the
arbitration agreement in a way that takes advantage of the client.1"'
The arbitration clause in Haynes provided for arbitration of claims whether
they were "based on a claim of inadequate representation or any other
ground."3' As long as Haynes had any legal fees outstanding to Kuder, it
seems that the court would have found the arbitration clause "susceptible of an
interpretation" which included any malpractice claim that Haynes raised.
Furthermore, based on the "or any other ground" language in the arbitration
clause, the court may have also sent any claim Haynes raised against Kuder to
arbitration. 3 9 Because of these possible conclusions, the Haynes decision seems
even more unsound. In particular, the decision may conflict with Ethics Opinion
211 from the District of Columbia, which states that arbitration agreements
contract against the party who drafted the contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
206 (1981).
133. See Haynes, 591 A.2d at 1292 (Steadman, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1289.
135. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 70, 83-85 and accompanying text.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 162-65 (discussing how this test allocates the burden of
persuasion).
138. Haynes, 591 A.2d at 1288 (emphasis added); see supra note 19 (listing this arbitration
clause).
139. This is true because, under the logic of the opinion, any claim could "involve[] the value
of Kuder's expenses" and could therefore "includeH allegations of 'inadequate representation.'"
Haynes, 591 A.2d at 1289.
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covering all disputes between an attorney and client are unethical "unless the
client is in fact counselled by another attorney. " '40
In addition, the arbitration clause in Kuder's retainer agreement may conflict
with Disciplinary Rule 6-102 of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility 4 ' to the extent that it limits Kuder's liability for malpractice. In
arbitration proceedings, many of the arbitrators are themselves lawyers who may
be reluctant to find that another lawyer has committed malpractice. These
lawyer-arbitrators may also be less likely to award the same amount of damages
as a disinterested judge may award if the case were in court. '
This discussion also raises the problem of allowing the lawyer essentially to
choose his or her forum. The Haynes court does not address the issue of unequal
bargaining position,'43 but at least one court has noted that the lawyer has the
opportunity to take advantage of the client when entering the retainer agreement
since the lawyer is an expert in this area while the client is probably relying on
the lawyer's expertise.' " Assuming that the lawyer is in a better bargaining
position than the client, the lawyer has an opportunity to include the arbitration
clause in the retainer agreement to the client's detriment.'45
Furthermore, the "susceptible of an interpretation" standard seems even more
questionable in light of an attorney's superior bargaining position. For instance,
a client may not realistically have the chance to bargain about the terms of the
retainer agreement with one who is an expert on such an agreement. 146 In fact,
the attorney may be able to require the client to submit to the arbitration clause
if the client really wants this particular lawyer's representation.
140. District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 211 (1990). This opinion is discussed
in more depth later in this Note. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
141. This rule states: "A lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself from or limit his liability
to his client for his personal malpractice." MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 6-102.
142. Two particular concerns for a client would be that arbitrators are not required to follow
substantive law and that the findings and rulings of arbitrators are generally insulated from appellate
review. See Brickman, supra note 3, at 280.
143. See generally Haynes, 591 A.2d 1286.
144. Uda!!, 366 F.2d at 676; see supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. If the lawyer is
indeed in a position of superior bargaining position, this makes the Haynes court's reliance on the
"susceptible of an interpretation" test even more suspect.
145. If the lawyer's duties to the client arise before a retainer agreement is entered, see supra
notes 77-79 and accompanying text, then this proposition would be subject to the lawyer's duty of
disclosure. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
146. See Udall, 366 F.2d at 676.
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B. Should an Attorney be Allowed to Meet
His or Her Duty of Disclosure Through the
Language of Arbitration Agreement Itself?
According to an ethics opinion from the District of Columbia, a lawyer who
includes an arbitration clause in a retainer agreement has an obligation to disclose
fully "to the client all of the implications of the arbitration provision, including
loss of the client's right to sue in court and have a jury trial." 147 The Haynes
court announces that this ethics opinion is its "polestar."148 However, the court
then proceeds virtually to ignore this opinion when it holds that the agreement
itself "sufficiently apprised Haynes that she was relinquishing her right to sue in
court. " 9"' In effect, the court decides that the arbitration clause itself is
sufficient to meet Kuder's duty of full disclosure. Judge Steadman, in his dissent,
claims that, because of its ambiguities, the arbitration clause "cannot ... serve
on its face as full disclosure of all its ramifications. "lI In relying solely on the
language of the arbitration clause, the Haynes court creates precedent for a lawyer
to use his or her expertise in the language of retainer agreements in order to
exploit the client. 5 ' The court also undermines the fiduciary duty which an
attorney owes his or her client."5 2
Haynes questioned whether Kuder had adequately explained the clause to
her, and the court appears to give the benefit of the doubt to the attorney. Kuder
stated in an affidavit that he had "fully discussed with Mrs. Haynes all of the
terms of the [retainer agreement], including the arbitration provisions," before she
signed the agreement." 3 However, Haynes claimed that Kuder did not "explain
the meaning or significance of the arbitration clause" to her and that she did not
understand that the arbitration clause removed her right to sue Kuder in court for
his negligence.' 54 Haynes also argued that the arbitration clause did not cover
her malpractice claim. 55
147. District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 190 (1988) (emphasis added); see supra
note 89.
148. Haynes, 591 A.2d at 1291. "Polestar" refers to the star Polaris (the North Star), WEBSTER'S
ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY Of THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1113 (1989 ed.), and the
word means "something that serves as a guiding principle," id.
149. Haynes, 591 A.2d at 1291.
150. Id. at 1292 n. 1 (Steadman, J., dissenting). Judge Steadman added that the majority opinion
is inconsistent in that the court relies on the language of the clause to serve as adequate notice of its
effect after the court had felt it necessary to resort to a rule of construction (the "susceptible of an
interpretation" test) to resolve the ambiguity in the clause. Id.
151. See Udall, 366 F.2d at 676. Additionally, when a client signs a retainer agreement, he or
she is relying on the attorney, id., which seems to place the client in an unequal bargaining position.
152. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
153. Haynes, 591 A.2d at 1288.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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The effect of relying solely on the language of the retainer agreement may
be twofold. First, the Haynes court essentially ignores the duty of disclosure
which an attorney owes a client.' 5 6  Second, the court misappropriates the
burden of persuasion to the client and establishes dangerous precedent. 
5 7
A 1990 District of Columbia Ethics Opinion states that an arbitration
agreement which covers all disputes between the attorney and client is unethical
"unless the client is represented by independent counsel in entering the
agreement."'5  According to the District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics
Committee, which issued this opinion, the reasoning behind the opinion is that it
is "unrealistic to expect lawyers to be able to provide enough information about
arbitration in a first visit to allow the client to make an informed decision."'5 9
The Haynes court proceeds to rely on the fact that Mrs. Haynes had another
attorney at the time that she entered the retainer agreement and on the fact that
Kuder sent the agreement to her home, at which time she was free to consult with
her other attorey.,0 However, the court cites no evidence which shows that
she did in fact consult with her Maryland attorney.
The Haynes court's reliance on the fact that Haynes had another attorney in
Maryland at the time the agreement with Kuder was executed is preposterous and
cannot be taken seriously. First, the court does not refer to any evidence that
Haynes did in fact turn to her old attorney for advice on this agreement. Second,
Haynes may have felt that her relationship with her Maryland attorney had
concluded since that attorney had advised her to consult another attorney.' 6'
Third, it seems bizarre to assume, when a client is switching lawyers, that the
client will return to the old lawyer for reassurance that the new lawyer is not
taking advantage of him or her. Fourth, there could be a very good reason that
the client is changing lawyers, such as that the client no longer trusts the old
156. See supra text accompanying note 70. Additionally, the weight of authority seems to
indicate that this duty of disclosure to a client would extend to the consultation before the execution
of a retainer agreement. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
157. A third possible effect of relying solely on the language of the arbitration clause may be to
give arbitration clauses heightened status; however, this Note will not address this topic.
158. District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 211 (1990) (emphasis added). The
Haynes court claims that it has "no occasion here to consider the soundness of this opinion," Haynes,
591 A.2d at 1291 n. 11, presumably because the opinion was issued "more than three years after the
[retainer] agreement" in this case was executed. Id. (Mrs. Haynes signed the retainer agreement on
December 22, 1986. Id. at 1288.) However, this makes no sense since the court uses as its
"polestar" a 1988 ethics opinion, id. at 1291, which itself would have been issued over a year after
the retainer agreement in this case was executed.
159. District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 211 (1990); see also Haynes, 591 A.2d
at 1291 n.1l.
160. Haynes, 591 A.2d at 1291.
161. Id. at 1287. It is not clear from the opinion whether her Maryland attorney advised her to
go to Kuder or generally to get an attorney in the District of Columbia. See id. However, if the
Maryland attorney had suggested Haynes go to Kuder himself, it would be even more ridiculous to
rely on the existence of the Maryland attorney since Haynes may have assumed that her Maryland
attorney, merely by suggesting Kuder, had already approved of Kuder's work.
1992]
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lawyer. Fifth, and probably most important, the simple fact that Haynes had
another lawyer at the time of preliminary consultation does not give Kuder a
license to exploit her in the retainer agreement unless she is smart enough to have
another lawyer check the agreement. It is entirely inconsistent with a lawyer's
fiduciary duty to the client to dispose of this duty simply by assuming that the
prospective client will be protected by a previous lawyer. Realistically, a
prospective client will probably rely on the new lawyer and not on a lawyer in a
different state to explain the agreement between the client and the new lawyer.
It hardly seems unreasonable for a client to rely on a professional with a duty of
disclosure to explain an agreement which that professional has drafted.
This decision also seems to shift the burden of persuasion to the client to
prove that an attorney met his duty of disclosure. The Haynes court concludes
that the retainer agreement itself met Kuder's duty of disclosure, 62 and, by
reaching this result, the court essentially allocates the burden to the client to prove
that the attorney did not fully disclose the terms or effects of the agreement. This
allocation is completely inconsistent with the attorney's duty of "full
disclosure" 63 because it seems to presume that the attorney did disclose unless
the client can prove otherwise. "M An attorney should not be able to dismiss his
duty to disclose the nature of an arbitration clause simply by including the
arbitration clause itself in the retainer agreement, particularly because the complex
nature of arbitration cannot be easily understood by a lay client. 6 It seems that
the client, instead of the lawyer, should be entitled to the benefit of the doubt
because of the higher standards that lawyers must meet.
VI. CONCLUSION
To give an attorney the benefit of the doubt in disagreements between an
attorney and client is completely inconsistent with the higher standards imposed
on an attorney when dealing with a client. If courts choose to disregard the
higher standards imposed on attorneys, or if they choose not to consider the
implications of an attorney's fiduciary obligation to the client, then the courts in
effect give an attorney a license to exploit his or her client when entering into the
retainer agreement. As a fiduciary to the client, a lawyer should not be able to
exploit a client through the lawyer's expertise in retainer agreements and his or
her superior bargaining position. It is the client and not the attorney who
deserves the benefit of the doubt when questions arise as to whether the
arbitration clause in the retainer agreement covers a particular dispute or whether
162. See id: at 1291.
163. Id. at 1291 (quoting District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 190 (1988)); see
supra notes 69-70, 83-85 and accompanying text.
164. This would be even harder for the client to prove since the client would be required to prove
the negative - that the attorney did not disclose.
165. See District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 211 (1990).
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an attorney fully disclosed to the client the ramifications of such an arbitration
clause.
The Haynes court first decides that the dispute between Haynes and Kuder
is covered by the arbitration clause simply because there is some interpretation of
the clause which "would include [the] claim for damages.""1 The court next
determines that, regardless of what Kuder did or did not tell his client, the
arbitration clause itself served to meet Kuder's duties of disclosure to his client.
In reaching these conclusions, the Haynes court gives deference to the lawyer and
establishes dangerous precedent that may allow a lawyer to use his or her
expertise with retainer agreements to exploit the client in the retainer agreement.
MARK G. ANDERSON
166. Haynes, 591 A.2d at 1289.
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